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INTRODUCTION 
 
Imagine a world in which a supervisor begins to have sex with a 
subordinate employee. After a year of sex with the supervisor, the 
employee gets married and decides to end the relationship. But when 
the employee tries to end the sexual relationship, the supervisor says 
that the employee will lose their job if the sex does not continue. 
Eventually the supervisor summons the employee into the supervisor’s 
office and asks the employee if a choice has been made. The employee 
says that there will be no more sex. Irate, the supervisor tells the 
employee to leave and follows the employee out, yelling that the 
employee will be fired. The next morning, the employee is fired.  
This situation, in fact, requires no imagination. The employee’s 
name was Alshafi Tate, his supervisor’s name was Dawn Burban, and 
Tate was forced to choose between sex and losing his job.1 Tate chose 
to end the sexual relationship, and he was fired the morning after he 
told Burban that he wasn’t “messing with” her anymore.2 Not every 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2009, Chicago-Kent College of Law; B.A., Bradley 
University. The author would like to thank Professor Richard J. Gonzalez of  
Chicago-Kent College of Law for his mentorship throughout law school and 
guidance in writing this article. 
1 See Tate v. Executive Mgmt. Serv., Inc., 546 F.3d 528, 529-31 (7th Cir. 
2008), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 1379 (2009). 
2 Id. 
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employee is fired the morning after refusing an ultimatum for sex from 
their supervisor. However, for many employees across the country, the 
situation described above, in which a subordinate employee must resist 
the sexual advances of a supervisor, is all too common. Employees in 
these situations must make a choice between submitting to their 
supervisor’s demands or rejecting the harassment. For those 
employees who reject the advances, they risk the consequences 
attendant to rebuffing a supervisor’s sexual advances. While some 
supervisors may merely accept that no means no, other supervisors 
may continue to harass employees or seek retribution for the rejection 
by changing work assignments, demeaning the employee, giving 
negative performance evaluations, or as in Mr. Tate’s case, firing the 
employee.  
Employees in these situations who are sexually harassed by their 
supervisors and oppose such harassment are protected by the 
retaliation provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.3 For 
the protections of Title VII’s retaliation provision to apply, however, 
an employee must have engaged in a protected activity.4 The 
retaliation provision provides that an employee has engaged in a 
protected activity if they have “opposed” an unlawful employment 
practice.5 Some activities by an employee in opposition to an unlawful 
employment practice, such as complaining of unwanted harassment to 
management or human resources, or filing a charge the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission, are widely accepted as fitting 
within Title VII’s retaliation provision.6 But Title VII does not define 
                                                 
3 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006) (barring an employer from retaliating 
against an employee because the employee “has opposed any practice made an 
unlawful employment practice by” Title VII). 
4 See id. 
5 Id. 
6 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006); Johnson v. Booker T. Wash. Broad. Serv., 
Inc., 234 F.3d 501, 507 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Statutorily protected expression includes 
filing complaints with the EEOC and complaining to superiors about sexual 
harassment.”); Joan M. Savage, Note, Applying the EEOC Deterrence Approach to 
the Adverse Employment Action Prong in a Prima Facie Case for Title VII 
Retaliation, 46 B.C. L. REV. 215, 222 (2004) (“The most typical type of 
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opposed, and the exact limits of what an employee must do to have 
opposed unlawful activity are unclear.7 In particular, despite how often 
it may occur in the workplace, the question of whether an employee 
who rejects a supervisor’s sexual advances has opposed an unlawful 
employment practice is an unanswered and controversial issue.  
The Supreme Court has never ruled on the issue. Numerous 
district courts have touched on it, but they are sharply divided.8 Some 
hold that resisting sexual advances falls squarely within Title VII’s 
protections,9 while others hold that without more, mere rejection of 
sexual advances is not protected activity.10 Only two federal circuit 
courts of appeal have addressed the issue and those circuits are also 
split. The Fifth Circuit recently held that an express rejection of a 
supervisor’s sexual advances does not qualify as protected activity 
under Title VII.11 The Eight Circuit, on the other hand, has held that an 
employee engages in “the most basic form of protected activity” by 
resisting a supervisor’s sexual advances.12 Faced with this precise 
                                                                                                                   
participation involves the plaintiff filing a discrimination charge against his or her 
employer, but also includes other activities, such as providing testimony or assisting 
in an investigation.”); Anna Ku, Note, “You’re Fired!” Determining Whether a 
Wrongly Terminated Employee Who Has Been Reinstated with Back Pay Has an 
Actionable Title VII Retaliation Claim, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1663, 1669 (2007) 
(“A complaining party may make a formal discrimination charge against her 
employer . . . Also, an employee may informally testify or otherwise participate in a 
discrimination charge against her employer.”) (citations omitted). 
7 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006). 
8 See, e.g., Black v. City & County of Honolulu, 112 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1049 
(D. Haw. 2000) (collecting cases); Ross v. Baldwin County Bd. of Educ., 2008 WL 
820573, *4-6 (S.D. Ala. 2008) (collecting cases). 
9 E.g. Quarles v. McDuffie County, 949 F. Supp. 846, 853 (S.D. Ga. 1996) 
(holding that rebuffing a supervisor’s sexual advances is “the most basic form” of 
protected activity). 
10 E.g. Speer v. Rand McNally & Co., 1996 WL 667810, *8 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 
1996) (“While [plaintiff] also alleges that [her supervisor] retaliated against her for 
her refusal of his sexual advances, her refusal is not the type of ‘protected activity’ 
which is properly the source of a Title VII retaliation claim.”). 
11 LeMaire v. Louisiana Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 480 F.3d 383, 389 (5th Cir. 
2007). 
12 Ogden v. Wax Works, Inc., 214 F.3d 999, 1007 (8th Cir. 2000). 
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issue in Tate v. Executive Management Services, Inc., the Seventh 
Circuit declined to decide the issue but held that Mr. Tate’s rejection of 
his supervisor’s advances and ultimatum did not constitute protected 
activity under Title VII.13 
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Tate and holdings by other 
courts that rebuffing a supervisor’s sexual advances is not protected 
activity under Title VII could have significant consequences for 
employees resisting workplace harassment. It is an unfortunate reality 
that many employees face sexual harassment in the workplace. 
Congress recognized that reality when it enacted Title VII to protect 
employees from harassment.14 It is another unfortunate reality that 
many employees who resist or oppose unlawful employment practices 
like sexual harassment face retribution from their employer. That is 
why Congress included a retaliation provision in Title VII.15 The 
retaliation provision of Title VII is designed allow employees to 
protect themselves and oppose what they believe in good faith to be an 
unlawful employment practice.16  
As more employees try to protect themselves from unlawful 
employment practices, retaliation claims filed with the E.E.O.C. have 
doubled over the past fifteen years.17 While reporting harassment to 
human resources or participating in an investigation are clearly 
protected activities under Title VII,18 an employee’s first line of 
                                                 
13 546 F.3d 528, 533 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 1379 (U.S. 2009). 
The court held that Mr. Tate did not have a reasonable good faith belief that he was 
harassed by his supervisor and therefore had not engaged in protected activity under 
Title VII. Id. 
14 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) (forbidding discrimination in 
employment on the basis of sex). 
15 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006) (outlawing an employer from retaliating 
against an employee because the employee “has opposed any practice made an 
unlawful employment practice by” Title VII). 
16 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006); Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 
U.S. 268, 270-72 (2001) (per curiam) (an employee does not have to oppose an 
employment practice that is actually unlawful, employee must merely have a 
reasonable belief that the practice violates Title VII). 
17 Glenn George, Revenge, 83 TUL. L. REV. 439, 441 (2008). 
18 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
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defense against a harasser may often be the rejection of sexual 
advances. The question of whether rejecting a supervisor’s sexual 
advances is protected by Title VII may have an extraordinary impact 
on how employees can resist workplace harassment and whether an 
employer could be liable when a supervisor gives the ultimatum, 
“continue to have sex or forfeit your job,” and the employee says “no.” 
If courts like Tate continue to draw the line in favor of employers, 
employees across the country may lose protection for one of the 
simplest ways to oppose harassment and the practical impact of Title 
VII’s retaliation clause will be diminished.  
This comment argues that to avoid these consequences and remain 
true to the language, purpose, and practical applications of Title VII’s 
retaliation clause, courts should hold that an in most circumstances, an 
employee who rebuffs their supervisor’s sexual advances has 
“opposed” an unlawful employment practice. Courts should still 
examine the facts of each case, but when the facts are close, the line 
should be drawn in favor of the employee.  
Part I provides a brief introduction to the relevant Title VII sexual 
harassment and retaliation law necessary to understand the Seventh 
Circuit’s holding in Tate. Part II examines the judicial precedent set for 
Tate, including the circuit split between the Fifth and Eighth circuits. 
Part III discusses the facts, holding, and reasoning of Tate. Part IV 
examines the Tate decision in light of the language of the retaliation 
provision and its recent interpretation by the Supreme Court. Part V 
discusses additional policy considerations that weigh in favor of 
protecting employees in this situation, including the importance of the 
supervisor-employee relationship, the purpose of the retaliation 
provision, and the practical impact of the retaliation clause. Finally, 
this comment concludes that the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Tate was 
incorrect and that opposition activity under the retaliation provision 
should usually include employees who rebuff their supervisor’s sexual 
advances. 
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I. TITLE VII  
 
A. Sexual Harassment 
 
Title VII was enacted to promote equality and reduce 
discrimination in the workplace.19 As part of these goals, Title VII 
forbids discrimination in employment on the basis of sex.20 A significant 
body of case law on sexual harassment law has developed out of Title VII’s 
ban on sex based discrimination. While a sexual harassment claim is 
distinct from a retaliation claim, a basic understanding of sexual 
harassment claims is important because this body of law can impact 
whether an employee’s opposition is covered by the retaliation provision 
and the two types of claims are usually brought together.21 A plaintiff 
alleging sexual harassment under Title VII can allege two different causes 
of action—a hostile work environment or quid pro quo claim. The primary 
difference between the two is that a hostile work environment claim 
focuses on proof that the harassment was severe or pervasive enough to 
create a hostile or offensive work environment,22 whereas a quid pro quo 
                                                 
19 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 
U.S. 792, 800 (“The language of Title VII makes plain the purpose of Congress to 
assure equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate those discriminatory 
practices and devices which have fostered racially stratified job environments to the 
disadvantage of minority citizens.”). Title VII’s language has been construed and 
interpreted broadly in order to accomplish the statute’s remedial purpose. Motorola, 
Inc. v. McLain, 484 F.2d 1339, 1344 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 
(1974). 
20 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000) (providing that “[i]t shall be an unlawful 
employment practice for an employer. . .to discriminate against any individual with 
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because 
of such individual’s. . .sex”). 
21 See generally Eisha Jain, Note, Realizing the Potential of the Joint 
Harassment/Retaliation Claim, 117 YALE L.J. 120 (2007) (discussing the interplay 
between harassment and retaliation claims). 
22 To establish a prima facie case of sexual harassment based on hostile work 
environment, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) she was subjected to unwelcome 
harassment; (2) the harassment was based on sex; (3) the sexual harassment had the 
effect of unreasonably interfering with the plaintiff’s work performance in creating 
an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment that seriously affected the 
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harassment claim focuses on situations where an employee’s submission 
to sexual demands is made a condition of tangible employment 
benefits.23  
These categories of cases are relevant to retaliation claims 
because a retaliation claim requires a plaintiff to show that they had a 
reasonable, good faith belief that they opposed an unlawful 
employment practice.24 Since retaliation claims and harassment claims 
are usually brought together, the underlying harassment claim can 
impact the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s belief that she opposed an 
unlawful employment practice.25 The facts supporting harassment and 
                                                                                                                   
psychological well-being of the plaintiff; and (4) there is a basis for employer 
liability. Robinson v. Sappington, 351 F.3d 317, 328-29 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 
542 U.S. 937 (2004). To prove that a hostile work environment existed, a plaintiff 
must also prove that the conduct was so severe or pervasive that it altered the 
conditions of her employment. Jackson v. Co. of Racine, 474 F.3d 493, 499 (7th Cir. 
2007).  
23 To establish a prima facie case of sexual harassment based on quid pro quo 
harassment, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) he is a member of a protected group; (2) 
the sexual advances were unwelcome; (3) the harassment was sexually motivated; 
(4) the employee’s reaction to the supervisor’s advances affected a tangible aspect of 
her employment; and (5) employer liability has been established. Bryson v. Chicago 
State Univ., 96 F.3d 912, 915 (7th Cir. 1996). See Mary M. v. N. Lawrence Cmty. 
Sch. Corp., 131 F.3d 1220, 1226 n.7 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[H]arassment, occurs when 
the receipt of benefits or the maintenance of the status quo is conditioned on 
acquiescence to sexual advances.”). The Supreme Court has largely abandoned the 
use of the quid pro quo and hostile work environment labels and instead 
distinguishes harassment claims based on whether a supervisor takes a tangible 
employment action against a subordinate. A tangible employment action constitutes a 
significant change in employment status, “such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, [or] 
reassignment with significantly different responsibilities.” Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 
524 U.S. 742, 760-65 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807-08, 
(1998). Many plaintiffs still frame their causes of action using those categories 
because they have separate analytical frameworks that are useful in distinguishing 
between different types of cases. See supra notes 22-23. 
24 Fine v. Ryan Int’l Airlines, 305 F.3d 746, 752 (7th Cir. 2002).  
25 See Clover v. Total Sys. Serv., Inc., 176 F.3d 1346, 1351-52 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(holding that the plaintiff did not engage in a statutorily protected activity because 
her belief that she opposed hostile work environment sexual harassment was not 
objectively reasonable). 
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retaliation claims also frequently overlap, although the claims have 
different analytical frameworks. 
 
B. Retaliation 
 
Title VII’s retaliation provision protects employees from retribution by 
employers when speaking out against unlawful employment practices.26 
The retaliation provision provides, in pertinent part: 
 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to 
discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he has opposed 
any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this 
subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or 
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing 
under this subchapter. 27 
 
The sentence outlawing discrimination because an employee has 
opposed an unlawful employment practice is known as the retaliation 
provision’s opposition clause.28 The following sentence, which bans 
discrimination based on participation in an investigation of an unlawful 
employment practice is known as the participation clause. 29 Both clauses 
protect an employee from retaliation but different sets of facts implicate 
each clause. An employee’s rebuff of a supervisor’s sexual advances, 
without reporting or discussing the advances with anyone else, falls under 
the opposition clause.30  
To prove a prima facie case of retaliation under either clause, a 
plaintiff must show that (1) he engaged in a statutorily protected activity, 
(2) an adverse action was taken by his employer, and (3) there is a causal 
                                                 
26 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3 (2006).  
27 Id.  
28 Id. 
29 Id.   
30 See Tate v. Executive Mgmt. Servs, Inc., 546 F.3d 528, 529-31 (7th Cir. 
2008), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 1379 (U.S. 2009). 
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connection between the two.31 The second two elements have been the 
subject of extensive litigation. With regard to the second element, the 
Supreme Court has adopted a broad objective standard for what 
constitutes an adverse employment action and noted that an adverse 
action may constitute a wide variety of actions depending on each 
workplace and employee. 32 To prove the third element of causation, a 
plaintiff must present evidence that an employer would not have taken 
an adverse employment action “but for” her protected activity.33  
The first element of a plaintiff’s prima facie retaliation case is less 
developed. To prove that a plaintiff engaged in protected activity, a 
plaintiff may claim that he engaged in protected activity under either 
the participation or opposition clause of Title VII’s retaliation 
                                                 
31 Boumehdi v. Plastag Holdings, L.L.C, 489 F.3d 781, 792 (7th Cir. 2007); 
Murray v. Chicago Transit Auth., 252 F.3d 880, 890 (7th Cir. 2001). An employee’s 
claim for retaliation under either clause is analyzed under the standard Title VII 
McDonnell Douglas burden shifting formula. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
411 U.S. 792 (1973). If a plaintiff proves a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden of 
proof shifts to the employer to show a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. If 
the employer produces “evidence which, taken as true, would permit the conclusion that 
there was a nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action,” then the burden shifts back to 
the employee to prove that the reason was merely a pretext for discrimination. St. Mary's 
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 508-10 (1993); E.E.O.C. v. Our Lady of the Resur. 
Med. Ctr., 77 F.3d 145, 148-49 (7th Cir. 1996). 
32 Burlington Northern v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67-70 (2006). The Seventh 
Circuit has noted that an adverse employment action must not be a mere 
inconvenience. Griffin v. Potter 356 F.3d 824, 829 (7th Cir. 2004). A plaintiff may 
prove an adverse employment action by presenting direct evidence showing “a 
‘convincing mosaic’ of circumstantial evidence that ‘allows a jury to infer 
intentional discrimination by the decision maker’” or indirectly by showing that she 
was treated less favorably by similarly situated employees. Rhodes v. Ill. Dep’t. of 
Trans., 359 F.3d 498, 504 (7th Cir. 2004); Moser v. Ind. Dep’ts of Corr., 406 F.3d 
895, 905 (7th Cir. 2005). Adverse employment actions include “job application 
procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee 
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of 
employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000); Rehling v. City of Chicago, 207 F.3d 
1009, 1018 (7th Cir. 2000). 
33 Moser v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 406 F.3d 895, 904 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting 
Wells v. Unisource Worldwide, Inc., 289 F.3d 1001, 1008 (7th Cir. 2002)). 
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provision.34 The participation clause covers an employee’s 
participation in any type of investigation of an unlawful employment 
practice.35 Under the opposition clause, an employee must have 
opposed any unlawful employment practice.36 A plaintiff does not 
have to prove that the practice he opposed was actually unlawful.37 
Rather, an employee only needs to show that he reasonably believed in 
good faith that he opposed a practice that violated Title VII.38 Thus, a 
plaintiff can lose on his sexual harassment claim but still prevail under 
a retaliation theory.39  
Still, what qualifies as having opposed unlawful discrimination 
under the opposition clause is unclear. Title VII does not define 
“opposed,” but it is commonly understood to include making a formal 
or sometimes informal complaint to an employer about the 
harassment.40 This serves to put an employer on notice about the 
harassment, and notice is an implicit element in a Title VII retaliation 
claim.41 Whether rebuffing a supervisor’s sexual advances constitutes 
opposition activity within the meaning of Title VII, however, is an 
unsettled question. 
                                                 
34 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3 (2006).  
35 Id. 
36 Id.  
37 Fine v. Ryan Int’l Airlines, 305 F.3d 746, 752 (7th Cir. 2002).  
38 Id. This requirement has both an objective and a subjective component. 
Little v. United Tech., Carrier Transicold Div., 103 F.3d 956, 959-60 (11th Cir. 
1997) (“A plaintiff must not only show that he subjectively (that is, in good faith) 
believed that his employer was engaged in unlawful employment practices but also 
that his belief was objectively reasonable in light of the facts and record presented.”). 
39 Fine, 305 F.3d at 752 (“[A] plaintiff need not prevail on her Title VII 
discrimination claim or have opposed an action that in fact violated Title VII to win 
a retaliation claim”). 
40 The E.E.O.C.’s Compliance manual provides four examples of opposition 
activity: (1) “threatening to file a charge or other formal complaint alleging 
discrimination;” (2) “complaining to anyone about alleged discrimination against 
oneself or others;” (3) “refusing to obey an order because of a reasonable belief that 
it is discriminatory;” and (4) “requesting reasonable accommodation or religious 
accommodation.” See EEOC Compliance Manual § 8-II-B(2) (May 20,1998). 
41 Durkin v. City of Chicago, 341 F.3d 606, 614 n.4 (7th Cir. 2003). 
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 II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT  
 
Only the Eighth and Fifth circuit courts of appeal have applied 
this statutory and judicial framework to the question of whether the 
rejection of a supervisor’s advances constitutes protected activity 
under Title VII. This section will examine the relevant facts and 
holdings of the Eight Circuit’s decision in Ogden v. Wax Works, Inc. 42 
and the Fifth Circuit’s decision in LeMaire v. Louisiana Department of 
Transportation & Development.43  
 
A. Ogden v. Wax Works, Inc. 
 
1. Factual Background  
 
On May 3, 1987 Wax Works Inc. hired Kerry Ogden as the sales 
manager of a music store.44 Ogden reported to a district manager who 
performed yearly evaluations of her performance; the evaluations were 
required for Ogden to receive her yearly raise.45 Ogden was an 
“outstanding” manager, increased sales of her store, and received 
bonuses and awards for her work.46 Robert Hudson became Ogden’s 
district manager in 1993 and Ogden claimed that he began sexually 
harassing her in late June or early July, 1994.47 Ogden detailed three 
separate incidents in which Hudson subjected her to unwelcome 
physical advances. First, Hudson grabbed her waist while asking her 
into his hotel room when the two were leaving a restaurant. 48 Second, 
Hudson put his arm around her while intoxicated in a bar with other 
                                                 
42 214 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 2000). 
43 480 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2007). 
44 Ogden, 214 F.3d at 1002-03. 
45 Id. at 1003. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
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employees. 49 Third, Hudson again physically grabbed or touched 
Hudson. 50 Each time she told Hudson not to touch her and to leave 
her alone.51  
                                                
Hudson also routinely propositioned Ogden at work52 and took an 
inappropriate interest in her personal life.53 For example, Hudson 
berated her and became angry when learning of any relationship with 
male friends outside of work.54 Whenever Ogden rebuffed Hudson’s 
advances, he criticized her work performance and regularly yelled at 
her in front of other employees over job related matters.55 Ogden 
believed that Hudson refused to complete her 1995 evaluation, and 
therefore refused to give her a raise, in retaliation for her refusal to 
give in to his advances.56 In April, 1995, Hudson’s supervisor ordered 
him to perform Ogden’s evaluation. 57 Hudson did not do so, however, 
and in June, 1995 he told Ogden he would only perform the evaluation 
if she went a three-day gambling spree with him; Ogden refused58 
Hudson responded by yelling at her and then refused her request to 
take a vacation.59  
 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. Ogden actually responded to the third incident of harassment with a 
physical threat against Hudson. Id. 
52 Id. Hudson asked Ogden to drinks after work, to stay with him at his home 
and “party,” to go to a motel room with him during a convention, and to attend a 
concert with him. Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. Hudson also offered to stay with Ogden to “protect” her from her ex-
husband. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 1003-04. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 1004. Hudson also told Ogden about affairs he had with other 
employees and how he had secured raises and promotions for those employees. He 
told Ogden she would not have received a raise in 1994 if it was not for his efforts. 
Id. 
59 Id. 
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A later confrontation between Hudson and Ogden in August over 
a managerial decision resulted in Hudson following Ogden to her car, 
screaming, smacking his fist, and saying he would “squish [her] out 
like a little fly.”60 Ogden called Wax Work’s home office and reported 
the incident and that Hudson yelled at her because she would not go 
out with him.61 She eventually told the management office about 
Hudson’s conduct, including his offers to stay at his home. 62 
Management visited the Sioux City store, but Ogden was unable to 
come in to work due to illness.63 After Wax Works concluded that 
Hudson was an asset to the company and would not be fired, the 
company terminated Ogden.64 Ogden never received her 1995 raise 
and left Wax Works in September of 1995.65 During the alleged 
harassment, Ogden lost forty pounds, became depressed, and 
frequently left work in tears.66 
 Ogden brought suit again Wax Works under Title VII for 
hostile work environment, quid pro quo sexual harassment, and 
retaliation.67 A jury found in favor of Ogden on all three claims and 
Wax Works moved for judgment as a matter of law or in the 
alternative, a new trial.68 The district court denied the motion and Wax 
Works appealed.69 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 1004-05. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. Management claimed that it fired her because of her allegations against 
Hudson. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 1002. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
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2. The Eight Circuit’s Opinion 
 
The Eight Circuit began its analysis by noting that its review of a 
jury verdict would be “extremely deferential”.70 The court concluded 
that Hudson’s numerous physical advances were sufficient to create a 
hostile work environment.71 The court also held that Ogden’s quid pro 
quo claim was properly supported by Hudson’s conditioning her 1995 
raise on her submission to his unwelcome advances.72 The court next 
found that Wax Work’s investigation was inadequate, and Ogden had 
put the employer on notice about the conduct by complaining about 
Hudson.73 
Turning to Ogden’s retaliation claim, the Eight Circuit examined 
Wax Work’s argument that Ogden failed to engage in “protected 
activity” under Title VII. The court held that Ogden “engaged in ‘the 
most basic form of protected activity’ when she told her 
supervisor. . .to stop his offensive conduct.”74 The court, quoting the 
language of Title VII’s opposition clause, held that a jury could have 
reasonably concluded that Ogden opposed discriminatory conduct by 
telling her supervisor to stop harassing her.75 The court further held 
that Ogden’s testimony that she opposed discriminatory conduct was 
bolstered by the jury’s conclusion that Hudson’s denial of the raise 
                                                 
70 Id. at 1006. The court said it would only overturn a jury verdict if there was 
no reasonable interpretation of the evidence that could support Ogden’s position. Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 1006-07. 
74 Id, at 1007 (quoting Quarles v. McDuffie County, 949  F. Supp. 846, 853 
(S.D. Ga. 1996)). In Quarles, an employee told her supervisor, who was verbally and 
physically harassing her, that his harassment made her uncomfortable and must stop. 
The court held that the employee “engaged in the most basic form of protected 
conduct; namely, telling a harasser, who also was serving as her supervisor, to cease 
all forms of physical and verbal harassment.” Quarles, 949  F. Supp. at 853. 
75 Ogden, 214 F.3d at 1007 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000)) (citations 
omitted). 
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was causally connected to Ogden’s opposition to his advances.76 
Finally, the court held that Wax Works retaliated against Ogden for 
opposing the discriminatory conduct when Hudson denied her 1995 
raise because of Ogden’s opposition.77 Accordingly, the court upheld 
the jury verdict on Ogden’s retaliation claim.78 
 
B. LeMaire v. Louisiana Department of Transportation & 
Development 
 
1. Factual Background 
 
In March 2001 Rene LeMaire started working for the Louisiana 
Department of Transportation and Development (“LaDOTD”) as a 
bridge operator.79 Milton Endres and Rodney Jones supervised 
LeMaire.80 In November 2001, LeMarie and a friend ran into Endres 
while LeMaire was being dropped off at work.81 Endres told the two 
he had been molested as a child and that he had molested LeMaire’s 
friend’s ex-husband when he was a child.82 Endres also told the men 
about his sex life and that he enjoyed being close with other men like 
his gay friends, who had been molested.83 During the exchange, 
                                                 
76 Id. The court also upheld the jury’s verdict on Ogden’s constructive 
discharge claim, upheld the jury’s award of front pay damages, and reduced the 
jury’s award of punitive damages. Id. at 1007-10. 
77 Id. at 1007 n.12. 
78 Id. The court also upheld the jury’s verdict on Ogden’s constructive 
discharge claim, upheld the jury’s award of front pay damages, and reduced the 
jury’s award of punitive damages. Id. at 1007-10. 
79 LeMaire v. Louisiana Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 480 F.3d 383, 385 (5th Cir. 
2007). LeMaire’s job “consisted of operating power-driven drawbridges and 
performing or overseeing preventative maintenance on the drawbridges.” Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id.  
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LeMaire repeatedly requested that Endres change the conversation 
topic.84 
In February 2002, LeMaire claimed that Endres told him that he 
had been with gay men who were having sex at Mardi Gras.85 
LeMaire was upset that he was forced to listen to Endres’ sexual 
comments.86 On June 15, 2002, Endres again spoke to LeMaire ab
sexually explicit topics.
out 
 
rk station.   
using to 
hout 
                                                
87 Endres also told LeMaire told that he would
make it impossible for him to transfer and that his only way to get 
away from him was to quit.88 Endres then ordered LeMaire to spray 
herbicide in a particular area by his wo 89
Spraying herbicide was not outside of LeMarire’s job duties, but 
LeMaire believed that the specific order on June 15 was retaliation for 
his resistance to Endres’ sexual stories.90 LeMaire refused to spray the 
herbicide, left his job site, and reported the incident and alleged 
harassment to Jones, who was also Endres’ supervisor.91 Jones 
convinced LeMaire to file a grievance alleging “unfair/unjust 
treatment” instead of a formal sexual harassment complaint.92 
LeMaire received a letter on June 18, 2002 stating that there was no 
conclusive evidence of misconduct by Endres.93 Later, on June 28, 
2002, LeMaire was suspended for two days without pay for ref
spray herbicide as Endres directed and for leaving the job site wit
authorization.94 LeMaire was then involved in a series of incidents in 
which he allegedly slept on the job, arrived late to work, and refused 
 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
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an order by Endres to mow grass around a bridge.95 LeMaire received 
a thirty day suspension as a result of those incidents. LaDOTD then 
investigated LeMaire’s conduct and eventually fired him on August 
15, 2002.96 
LeMaire brought sexual harassment and retaliation claims under 
Title VII against LaDOTD.97 The employer moved for summary 
judgment and in a single page order providing no reasons for its 
decision, the district court granted the employer’s motion on all 
claims.98 LeMaire appealed.  
 
2. The Fifth Circuit’s Opinion 
 
The Fifth Circuit began its discussion by noting that its review 
was complicated by the district court’s lack of analysis and sparse 
briefing by the parties.99 The court then reversed the district court’s 
dismissal of the sexual harassment claim because the defendant had 
merely denied the existence of the allegedly offensive remarks and 
filed a motion citing no legal authority on the issue.100 Turning to 
LeMaire’s retaliation claims, the court identified four potential sources 
of retaliation. Those sources included (1) Endres’ order to LeMaire to 
spray herbicide; 101 (2) other general acts of retaliation by Endres;102 
                                                 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 385-86. 
97 Id. at 386-87. While it is unclear from the court’s opinion, it appears that 
LeMaire filed hostile work environment and quid pro quo sexual harassment claims 
against LaDOTD. See id. at 388. 
98 Id. at 386-87. The district court stated that “written reasons” for its decision 
would be filed at a later date. The district court, however, never filed any reasons for 
its decision. Id. 
99 Id. at 387. 
100 Id. at 387-88 (stating that the defendant “filed a bare-bones motion that 
failed to cite to any legal precedent or standards regarding sexual harassment”). 
101 Id. at 389. 
102 The court did not identify what other “general acts” of retaliation if was 
referring to. Id. 
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(3) LeMaire’s two-day suspension; 103 and (4) LeMaire’s 
termination.104 The court analyzed each potential act of retaliation 
separately to determine whether LeMaire could establish a prima facie 
case.  
With regard to the second allegation of retaliation, the court 
reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the 
miscellaneous allegations because LaDOTD did not move for 
summary judgment on those claims.105 On the third allegation, 
LeMaire’s two day suspension, the court noted that facts regarding the 
order to spray herbicide, which led to the suspension, were unclear, 
and that it was similarly unclear whether Endres was involved in the 
decision to suspend LeMaire. The court therefore reversed the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment because of the unclear facts 
underlying the two-day suspension.106 On the fourth allegation, 
LeMaire’s termination, the court affirmed summary judgment because 
LeMaire failed to refute LaDOTD’s legitimate, non-discriminatory 
reasons for firing him.107  
With regard to the first allegation, the order to spray herbicide, the 
court considered LeMaire’s argument that the order was retaliation for 
his rejection of Endres’ sexual advances.108 The court noted that at the 
time of Endres’ order to spray herbicide and LeMaire’s refusal to 
follow the order, LeMaire had not yet complained to anyone about the 
harassment.109 Therefore, since LeMaire had not yet complained to 
anyone of Endres’ conduct, the only protected activity he could have 
engaged in was actually rejecting Endres’ sexual advances.110 The 
                                                 
103 Id. at 389. 
104 Id. at 389. 
105 Id. at 390-91. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 390-91. LaDOTD’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for firing 
LeMaire included sleeping on the job, being four hours late to work, and refusing to 
mow the grass. Id. 
108 Id. at 389. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
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court held that LeMaire had provided no authority “for the proposition 
that rejecting sexual advances constitutes a protected activity for 
purposes of a retaliation claim under Title VII.”111 To support its 
holding, the Fifth Circuit cited Frank v. Harris County,112 an 
unpublished Fifth Circuit decision that, without citing any authority, 
reached the same conclusion.113 The Fifth Circuit therefore held that 
LeMaire’s rejection of Endres’ sexual advances was not a protected 
activity under Title VII and affirmed summary judgment for Wax 
Works on that issue.114 
 
III. TATE V. EXECUTIVE MANAGEMENT SERVICES  
 
A. Factual Background 
 
On August 19, 2002, Executive Management Services hired 
Alshafi Tate to clean office buildings.115 Dawn Burban was Tate’s 
immediate supervisor and picked him to work under her on a team of 
employees to clean buildings.116 Within approximately one week, the 
two began having consensual sex two to three times a week while at 
work or at the home of a co-worker.117 The two continued having sex 
throughout his employment, except for a short period in 2003.118 
                                                 
111 Id.. 
112 118 Fed. Appx. 799, 804 (5th Cir. 2004) (unpublished). 
113 Id. The court in Frank held that an employee’s rejections of her 
supervisor’s sexual advances was not opposition activity because she “provide[ed] 
no authority for the proposition that a single ‘express rejection’. . .constitutes as a 
matter of law a protected activity for purposes of retaliation.” Id. 
114 LeMaire, 480 F.3d at 389, 392. One judge concurred in part and dissented 
in part on the basis that he would have affirmed the district court’s entire order of 
summary judgment. Id. at 392-96 (DeMoss, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) 
115 Tate v. Executive Mgmt. Serv., Inc., 546 F.3d 528, 529 (7th Cir. 2008), 
cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 1379 (2009). 
116 Id. at 529-30. 
117 Id. Burban denied that the two ever had a sexual relationship. Id. 
118 Id. Tate worked in a different building than Burban for this short time 
period. Id. 
 309
19
Grant: Supervisors, Sex, and the Seventh Circuit: No Should Always Mean
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2009
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 4, Issue 2                         Spring 2009 
 
Based on Burban’s recommendation, EMS promoted Tate after only 
one week of work and raised his pay.119 In August, 2003, Tate got 
married.120 Burban, however, continually called Tate’s home, which 
upset his wife.121 Tate testified that he wanted to “keep the slate clean” 
between himself and his wife and tried to end the sexual relationship 
with Burban in October, 2003.122  
 Burban, however, refused to end the sexual relationship. She 
told Tate that she expected the relationship to continue and that he 
would lose his job if it did not.123 In December, 2003, while at a 
holiday dinner party with co-workers, Burban told Tate that they must 
continue having sex or it would cost him his job.124 Tate told her that 
he did want to continue the relationship. Burban responded by telling 
him that he could have a couple days to think about it.125 Two weeks 
later, Burban again asked Tate whether he had “made a choice yet.”126 
It was not clear how Tate responded to that inquiry. On January 13, 
2004, Tate arrived to work for an evening shift.127 Burban summoned 
him to her office, closed her door, and asked him if he had made a 
decision. Tate said that he had “wasn’t messing with her anymore.”128 
At this point, Burban raised her voice and yelled that Tate did not 
“know who [he was] f---king with” and that he “could leave right 
now.”129 
When Tate left Burban’s office, she followed him into a break 
room, yelling that she would “have [his] job” and was going “to have 
                                                 
119 Id. at 530. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. Tate testified that he believed Burban was “was trying to make a hard 
choice for me.” Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
 310
20
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 4
http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol4/iss2/4
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 4, Issue 2                         Spring 2009 
 
[his] ass fired.”130 Tate told Burban to call Darren Taylor, Burban’s 
supervisor who was not in the office at the time. Burban called Taylor 
but did not allow Tate to speak with him.131 Taylor told Burban to tell 
Tate to go home and he was escorted out by a security guard around 
4:45 P.M.132 Burban claimed that she sent Tate home because he 
refused, without reason, to go to a new work assignment and became 
loud and belligerent.133 Tate, on the other hand, argued that Burban did 
not give him any work-related assignment before he was sent home.134 
Burban then called EMS’s general manager, Nancy Scheumann, and 
reported that Tate had refused to do his assigned work and was sent 
home. Burban subsequently prepared an “insubordination” report for 
Tate.135 
The following day, Scheumann had made the decision to fire Tate 
by 8:50 a.m.136 EMS claimed that Scheumann’s decision to fire Tate 
was based on Tate’s employment record and conversations with 
Burban, Taylor, and the security officer.137 Tate tried to call 
Scheumann and Taylor that day to discuss the incident. He contacted 
                                                 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. The security guard heard Burban and Taylor arguing and heard Burban 
tell Taylor “If you can’t do what I tell you to do, just leave.” Id. See Brief of 
Plaintiff-Appellee, Tate v. Executive Mgmt. Serv., Inc., 546 F.3d 528 (7th Cir. 
2008), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 1379 (2009), 2008 WL 401044 (stating that the 
security guard approached Tate and Burban around 4:45 P.M). 
133 Tate, 546 F.3d at 530-31. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. Burban wrote that Tate said cleaning a particular building was not part 
of his job, that he only needed to complete certain tasks that would not have taken 
eight hours to complete, and that Burban told him he needed to complete eight hours 
of work. Burban further wrote that she told Tate to go home after he continued to 
refuse the do the work, and that a security guard heard the argument and escorted 
Tate out of the building. Id. 
136 Id. at 531. 
137 Id. The security officer, however, testified that he did not speak to 
Scheumann until approximately one month after the incident. Scheumann also 
testified that an investigation was not warranted because of Tate’s alleged 
insubordination. Id. 
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EMS’s corporate headquarters and reached a human resources official 
who told him that he had been terminated for insubordination.138 Tate 
asked if he could explain his side of the story but was not given an 
opportunity to do so and the conversation lasted less than one 
minute.139 Burban singed Tate’s termination form.140 
Tate brought harassment and retaliation claims against EMS.141 
The jury found against Tate on his sexual harassment claim but 
returned a verdict in his favor on the retaliation claim.142 EMS 
renewed its previous motion for judgment as a matter of law or in the 
alternative, a new trial.143 EMS argued that it had no knowledge of 
Burban’s retaliatory motive and discharged Tate based on the report of 
the security officer, a neutral and disinterested witness. EMS also 
argued that Tate did not engage in a protected activity when he told 
Burban he would not have sex with her to keep his job.144  
 
B. The District Court’s Opinion 
 
Addressing EMS’s post-trial motion, the district court began by 
examining the language of the opposition clause of Title VII’s 
retaliation provision.145 The court stated that threatening a person with 
termination if he or she refuses to continue a sexual relationship is an 
unlawful employment practice.146 The court held that based on Title 
VII’s language, a “straightforward reading of the statute’s text requires 
                                                 
138 Id. 
139 Id.  
140 Id.  
141 Id.  
142 Id. Curiously, the jury awarded Tate no compensatory damages on his 
retaliation claim. Tate v. Executive Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 2007 WL 1650410 (N.D. 
Ind. 2007), overruled by Tate v. Executive Mgmt. Servs, Inc., 546 F.3d 528 (7th Cir. 
2008), cert. denied, 2009 WL 62165 (U.S. 2009). 
143 Tate, 546 F.3d at 531. 
144 Id. 
145 See Tate, 2007 WL 1650410 at *2 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006)). 
146 Id. (citing Mary M. v. N. Lawrence Cmty. Sch. Corp., 131 F.3d 1220, 1226 
n. 7 (7th Cir. 1997)). 
 312
22
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 4
http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol4/iss2/4
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 4, Issue 2                         Spring 2009 
 
finding that rebuffing sexual harassment can in some situations be 
considered opposition to an unlawful employment practice.”147 
Further, the court held that when an employee refuses a supervisor’s 
ultimatum to continue having a sexual relationship or else be 
terminated, the employee could reasonably be opposing the sexual 
relationship or change in the terms of employment.148 In this case, the 
court found that Tate refused Burban’s ultimatum to have sex, but did 
so under the threat of termination.149  
The court then addressed the concerns of other courts holding that 
rebuffing a supervisor’s sexual advances is not opposition activity. 
First, the court rejected the argument that rebuffing sexual advances 
cannot constitute a form of protected activity because if it did, every 
harassment claim would automatically include a retaliation claim150 
The court reasoned that when an employee is fired for saying no to a 
supervisor’s ultimatum to continue having sex or end employment, the 
reason for firing could be the employee’s opposition to the change in 
employment terms, the sexual harassment, or both.151 The court found 
that the reasons for an employee’s opposition in this situation, while 
intertwined, are not identical and represent separate claims—one for 
harassment (opposing the sexual relationship) and another for 
retaliation (opposing the change in employment terms now condition 
upon acquiescence to the harassment).152 The court therefore 
dismissed the concern that every harassment claim would 
automatically state a retaliation claim. Second, the court rejected the 
concern that a retaliation claim in this situation is duplicative and 
might confuse a jury, reasoning that those hypothetical concerns were 
                                                 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
150 See id. (citing Del Castillo v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 941 F. Supp. 437, 438-
39 (S.D. N.Y. 1996). 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
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not sufficient to ignore the plain language of Title VII’s retaliation 
provision.153  
 Thus, the court found that it was reasonable for the jury to 
conclude that Tate was fired for opposing the unlawful practice of 
making employment contingent on sex.154 Accordingly, the court 
denied EMS’s motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and 
for a new trial.155 EMS appealed. 
 
C. The Seventh Circuit’s Opinion 
 
The Seventh Circuit turned directly to the issue of whether Tate 
engaged in a protected activity under Title VII.156 After quoting Title 
VII’s retaliation provision, the court recognized the circuit split 
between the Eighth and Fifth Circuits.157 The court declined to decide 
the issue but was willing to assume that there may be situations in 
which a plaintiff who rejects his supervisor’s advances has engaged in 
a protected activity.158 The court held that even under this assumption, 
Tate did not engage in a protected activity because he did not 
reasonably believe that he opposed an unlawful employment 
practice.159 
The court focused its analysis on the requirement that a plaintiff 
must have subjectively believed they were opposing an unlawful 
employment practice.160 The court cited precedent in which employees 
demonstrated their belief that they were being harassed by 
                                                 
153 See id. (examining Rashid v. Beth Israel Med. Cent., 1998 WL 689931, *2 
(S.D.N.Y.1998)). 
154 Id. at *2-3. The court also concluded that there was a sufficient basis for 
employer liability because Scheumann acted as Burban’s “rubber stamp” in firing 
Tate, there was no independent investigation, and Tate was prevented from telling 
his side of the story. Id. at *3-4. 
155 Id. at *4-5. 
156 Tate, 546 F.3d at 532. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. (citing Fine v. Ryan Int’l Airlines, 305 F.3d 746, 752 (7th Cir. 2002)). 
160 Id. 
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complaining directly to management or threatening to go the EEOC 
with complaints.161 The court then examined several statements from 
Tate that it considered particularly important to the issue of whether he 
believed he was being harassed.162 First, when Bourban gave him the 
final ultimatum, he told her they “were not good with each other” and 
that he “was not messing with her anymore.”163 Second, if Tate would 
have had an opportunity to explain his story to upper level 
management, he would have said that he was not insubordinate and 
was “wrongly mistreated.” 164 Third, Tate said he would have liked 
management to know that Burban had called his home and had an 
argument with his wife.165 Finally, Tate testified that he “wanted to 
leave Dawn” so that he could “start off with a clean slate” and “be 
true” to his wife.166 
The court found that while there was no doubt that Tate protested 
Burban’s actions, his statements indicated personal reasons for ending 
the sexual relationship, rather than a belief that he was being 
harassed.167 In fact, the court found the record “devoid” of any 
statements proving that Tate believed he was opposing an unlawful 
employment practice.168 The court reasoned that protecting an 
employee who did not believe he was being harassed would not serve 
the purpose of the reasonable good faith requirement.169 Finding that 
                                                 
161 Id. (citing Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1450 (7th Cir. 
1994), and Holland v. Jefferson Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 883 F.2d 1307, 1315 (7th Cir. 
1989)). 
162 Id. at 532-33. 
163 Id.  
164 Id. at 533. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. (holding that Tate’s “statements point to personal reasons for ending the 
relationship rather than concerns about the legality of Burban's behavior.”). 
168 Id. 
169 Id. (citing Mattson v. Caterpillar, Inc., 359 F.3d 885, 891 (7th Cir.2004) 
(“The purpose of requiring that plaintiffs reasonably believe in good faith that they 
have suffered discrimination is clear. Title VII was designed to protect the rights of 
employees who in good faith protest the discrimination they believe they have 
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Tate did not in oppose what he believed was harassment, the court 
held that he had not engaged in a protected activity.170 Accordingly, 
the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling and held that 
EMS was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Tate’s retaliation 
claim.171 
 
IV. THE LANGUAGE OF TITLE VII: DEFINING OPPOSED 
 
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Tate did not focus on the 
definition of oppose.172 However, the ultimate result of the case, that 
an employee who rebuffed his superior’s demands for sex did not 
oppose an unlawful employment activity, creates precedent that affects 
how opposed will be defined in this situation. Holdings like the 
Seventh Circuit’s in Tate that an employee who rejects his supervisor’s 
demands for sex did not oppose an unlawful employment practice run 
counter to the definition of oppose. This section will show how an 
employee who rebuffs a supervisor demands for sex satisfies the 
retaliation clause’s opposition requirement by examining (A) the plain 
language of Title VII; (B) the retaliation clause’s legislative history; 
and (C) the Supreme Court’s recent interpretation of the retaliation 
clause in Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and 
Davidson County, Tenn.173 
 
A. The Plain Language of Title VII  
 
The first step in any form of statutory interpretation is to examine 
the plain language of a statute.174 The opposition clause of Title VII’s 
                                                                                                                   
suffered and to ensure that such employees remain free from reprisals or retaliatory 
conduct.”) (emphasis added by the court)). 
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
172 The court in Tate focused on the requirement that an employee have a good 
faith reasonable belief that they are opposing unlawful discrimination. Id. 
173 129 S.Ct. 846 (2009). 
174 See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98 (2003) (holding that “[o]ur 
precedents make clear that the starting point for. . .analysis is the statutory text” and 
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retaliation provision states that an employer may not retaliate against 
an employee who “has opposed any practice made an unlawful 
employment practice by” Title VII.175 Sexual harassment, whether 
hostile work environment or quid pro quo harassment, is an unlawful 
employment practice.176 Since a supervisor’s sexual advances are an 
unlawful employment practice, it follows that refusing to submit to 
those advances or verbally objecting to them is a method of opposing 
the unlawful employment practice. In fact, many district courts have 
followed this exact method of analysis in holding that rebuffing a 
supervisor’s sexual advances is opposition activity under Title VII’s 
retaliation clause.177 Still, Title VII’s plain language does not define 
opposed or make its definition clear.  
 
B. Legislative History 
 
The legislative history behind the retaliation provision offers no 
guidance on how to interpret or apply it, or even why it was added to 
Title VII. The committee reports simply repeat the retaliation 
provision’s language without any explanation for its meaning.178 The 
                                                                                                                   
that “where. . .the words of the statute are unambiguous, the ‘judicial inquiry is 
complete.’”) (quoting Connecticut Nat.’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-254, 
(1992)). 
175 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006). 
176 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006); supra notes 22-23 and 
accompanying text. 
177 Little v. NBC, 210 F. Supp. 2d 330, 385-86 (S.D. N.Y. 2002) (holding that 
“sexual harassment by an employer or supervisor is an unlawful practice, and an 
employee's refusal is a means of opposing such unlawful conduct”); Fleming v. 
South Carolina Dep’t of Corr., 952 F. Supp. 283, 288 (D. S.C. 1996) (holding that 
the employer’s “alleged conduct of requesting sex from the plaintiff is an unlawful 
practice and the plaintiff’s refusal is opposition to such unlawful conduct”); See also 
Ogden v. Wax Works, Inc. 214 F.3d 999, 1007 (8th Cir. 2000) (using similar 
reasoning). 
178 See Edward C. Waltershied, A Question of Retaliation: Opposition Conduct 
As Protected Expression Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29 BOSTON 
C. L. REV. 391, 393-94 (1988) (examining the committee reports). The proceedings 
and floor debates concerning the retaliation clause also reveal nothing about its 
purpose or intended application. See Hochstadt v. Worcester Found. for 
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only statement of congressional intent related to the provision occurs 
in the statement that “management prerogatives. . .are to be left 
undisturbed to the greatest extent possible. Internal affairs of 
employers. . .must not be interfered with except to the limited extent 
that correction is required in discrimination practices.”179 The rest of 
the history surrounding Title VII is similarly unhelpful.180 Courts, 
therefore, have been left to interpret the meaning of the retaliation 
clause and have traditionally relied on its plain language. This reliance 
makes sense, especially given that at the time of every previous 
decision on the issue of what constitutes opposition activity for 
purposes of retaliation, the Supreme Court had never offered guidance 
on the meaning of opposed. In its recent decision in Crawford v. 
Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, 
Tennessee however, the Supreme Court, for the first time, discussed 
the meaning of opposed.181 
 
C. Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson 
County, Tennessee 
 
1. Factual Background 
 
The plaintiff in Crawford was asked by her employer’s human 
resources department, as part of an ongoing investigation into rumors 
                                                                                                                   
Experimental Biology, 545 F.2d 222, 230 (1st Cir. 1976) (“Neither in its wording 
nor legislative history does section 704(a) make plain how far Congress meant to 
immunize hostile and disruptive employee activity when it declared it unlawful for 
an employer to discriminate against an employee ‘because he has opposed any 
practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter . . . .’ 42 U.S.C. s 
2000e-3(a). The statute says no more, and the committee reports on the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 and the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1963, which later 
became Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, repeat the language of 704(a) without any 
explanation.”) 
179 See Waltershied, supra note 178, at 393. 
180 Title VII’s legislative history has been declared “judicially 
incomprehensible.” Beverly v. Lone Star Lead Constr. Corp., 437 F.2d 1136, 1138 
n.7 (5th Cir. 1971). 
181 129 S.Ct. 846 (2009). 
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of sexual harassment by a supervisor, if she had ever witnessed 
inappropriate behavior by the supervisor.182 The plaintiff reported 
several instances of inappropriate sexual behavior by the supervisor 
and two other employees gave similar reports.183 The employer took 
no action against the supervisor and fired all three accusers after the 
investigation was complete.184 The employee filed suit, claiming the 
she was fired in retaliation for reporting the supervisor’s conduct, in 
violation the opposition and participation clauses of Title VII’s 
retaliation provision.185  
The district court granted summary judgment for the employer, 
finding that simply answering questions by investigators in an already 
ongoing internal investigation initiated by another employee was not 
opposition activity under Title VII.186 The court also found that 
participation in the investigation did not fit under Title VII’s 
participation clause because it was not done pursuant to a pending 
EEOC charge.187 The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that Title VII’s 
opposition clause “demands active, consistent ‘opposing’ activities to 
warrant. . .protection against retaliation.”188 The court held that 
answering questions in an investigation started by someone else and 
then not taking any other action after the investigation, such as filing 
an EEOC charge, was not the type of “overt opposition” that Title VII 
protects.189 The court also concluded that since the investigation was 
not conducted due to a pending EEOC charge, there was no violation 
of the participation clause.190 The plaintiff appealed and the Supreme 
                                                 
182 Id. at 849. 
183 Id.  
184 Id. The employer claimed it had fired the plaintiff for embezzlement.  
185 Id. at 850. 
186 Id.  
187 Id. 
188 Crawford v. Metropolitan Gov’t of Nashville, 211 Fed.Appx. 373, *2-3 (6th 
Cir. 2006) (quoting Bell v. Safety Grooving and Grinding, LP, 107 Fed. App’x. 607, 
610 (6th Cir. 2004)), overruled by Crawford, 129 S.Ct. at 846. 
189 Id. at *3. 
190 Id. at *3-4. 
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Court granted certiorari to answer the question of whether an 
employee who speaks out about harassment not on her own initiative, 
but in answering questions during an employer’s internal investigation 
has opposed an unlawful employment practice under Title VII.191 
 
2. The Majority Opinion 
 
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Sixth Circuit’s 
decision and held that an employee who speaks out about 
discrimination during an employer’s investigation is protected by Title 
VII’s retaliation provision.192 The Court held that since Title VII does 
not define oppose, the word retains its ordinary meaning.193 
Examining dictionary definitions of the word, the Court held that 
oppose means “‘to resist or antagonize. . .; to contend against; to 
confront; resist; withstand” and that although those definitions implied 
affirmative acts, “‘resist frequently implies more active striving than 
oppose.’”194 In dicta, the court noted that oppose is also defined as “to 
be hostile or adverse to, as in opinion.”195 The Court also cited the 
EEOC Compliance manual, which defines opposition as 
communicating a belief to an employer that it has engaged in 
employment discrimination.196  
Under these definitions, the Court held that the plaintiff’s 
statement to her employer about the supervisor was covered by the 
                                                 
191 Crawford, 129 S.Ct. at 849. 
192 Id. 
193 Id. at 850 (citing Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)). 
194 Id. (quoting Webster's New International Dictionary 1710 (2d ed. 1958)) 
(emphasis in original). 
195 Id. (quoting Random House Dictionary of the English Language 1359 (2d 
ed.1987)). 
196 Id. at 850-51 (“‘When an employee communicates to her employer a belief 
that the employer has engaged in . . . a form of employment discrimination, that 
communication’ virtually always ‘constitutes the employee’s opposition to the 
activity.’”) (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, Crawford v. 
Metropolitan Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson County, Tenn. 129 S.Ct. 846 (2009) 
(citing 2 EEOC Compliance Manual §§ 8-II-B(1)-(2) (Mar. 2003))). 
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opposition clause because it was “an ostensibly disapproving account” 
of harassment that caused her employer to fire her.197 The Court also 
held that the plaintiff’s descriptions of the supervisor’s inappropriate 
sexual behavior would “certainly qualify in the minds of reasonable 
jurors” as resistant, antagonistic or antagonistic to the supervisor’s 
harassment.”198 Further, the Court expressly rejected the Sixth 
Circuit’s requirement that opposition requires active behavior or the 
instigating of a complaint to be protected.199 In dicta, the Court stated 
that “‘[o]ppose’ goes beyond ‘active, consistent’ behavior in ordinary 
discourse, where we would naturally use the word to speak of 
someone who has taken no action at all to advance a position beyond 
disclosing it.”200 The Court provided examples of this type of silent 
opposition, such as opposing slavery before Emancipation, opposing 
capital punishment without writing letters or protesting, and an 
employee who simply maintains the status quo and refuses to 
implement an employer’s discriminatory policy.201  
The Court also rejected the argument that if retaliation is an easier 
claim for an employee to make, employers will be discouraged from 
investigating discrimination.202 Finally, the Court found its holding 
consistent with the primary objective of the retaliation clause, which is 
to avoid harm to employees.203 The Court therefore concluded that the 
                                                 
197 Id. 
198 Id. at 851. The Court also noted that it was not unclear whether the 
employee opposed the supervisor’s actions because she “gave no indication that [his] 
gross clowning was anything but offensive to her.” Id. at n.2. 
199 Id. at 851 (holding that “though these requirements obviously exemplify 
opposition as commonly understood, they are not limits of it”). 
200 Id. 
201 Id. 
202 Id. at 851-52. The Court held that employers have a strong incentive to 
inquire about and remedy any potential workplace discrimination and that a broader 
interpretation of “oppose” posed no threat to that incentive. Id. 
203 Id. at 852. (“If it were clear law that an employee who reported 
discrimination in answering an employer’s questions could be penalized with no 
remedy, prudent employees would have a good reason to keep quiet about Title VII 
offenses against themselves or against others.”). 
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employee’s conduct in answering questions in an internal investigation 
was opposition activity.204 Accordingly, the Court reversed the Sixth 
Circuit’s decision.205 
 
3. Justice Alito’s Concurring Opinion 
 
Justices Alito wrote a separate concurring opinion in which 
Justice Thomas joined to express his understanding that the Court’s 
holding did not and would not extend beyond employees who testify 
in internal investigations or similar “purposive” conduct.206 Justice 
Alito noted that while not all conduct must be active or consistent, the 
primary definitions of the term oppose require conduct that is “active 
and purposive.”207 Justice Alito approved of the definition of opposed 
advanced by the plaintiff,208 but believed the Court should not expand 
its definition any further. Specifically, Justice Alito took issue with the 
Court’s citation to the definition of oppose as in “‘to be hostile or 
adverse to, as in opinion,’”209 which he believed could include silent 
opposition.210 
                                                 
204 Id. at 852-53. (“[N]othing in the statute requires a freakish rule protecting 
an employee who reports discrimination on her own initiative but not one who 
reports the same discrimination in the same words when her boss asks a question.”).  
205 Id. at 852-53. The Court did not reach the employee’s participation clause 
argument. Id. at 853. 
206 Id. at 853-55 (Alito, J. concurring). 
207 Id. (“For example, the first three definitions of the term in the dictionary 
upon which the Court principally relies are as follows: ‘1. to act against or provide 
resistance to; combat. 2. to stand in the way of; hinder; obstruct. 3. to set as an 
opponent or adversary.’”) (quoting Random Dict. 1359 (2d ed.1987)). 
208 The plaintiff argued, and Justice Alito agreed, that oppose means “‘taking 
action (including making a statement) to end, prevent, redress, or correct unlawful 
discrimination.’” Id. at 854 (quoting Brief for Petitioner, Crawford v. Metropolitan 
Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson County, Tenn. 129 S.Ct. 846 (2009)). 
209 Id. at 854 (emphasis added by the Court). 
210 Id. 
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Justice Alito doubted whether silent opposition is covered by Title 
VII.211 In particular, he noted that all of the other conduct protected in 
the retaliation clause, such as making a charge, testifying, or assisting 
or participating in an investigation, requires active or purposive 
conduct.212 He went on to say that protecting conduct that is not active 
could have the negative consequence of allowing employees to 
recover on retaliation claims without expressing “a word of opposition 
to their employers.”213 Additionally, he noted that with the recent 
increase in the number of retaliation claims filed at the EEOC, an 
expansive interpretation of the opposition clause could spur the filing 
of even more claims.214 Finally, Justice Alito made clear that the 
question of whether the opposition clause protected employees who do 
not communicate their opposition to their employer was not before the 
Court and that the answer to this question was “far from clear.”215 
 
4. Crawford’s Application 
 
The Supreme Court in Crawford did not decide whether the 
opposition clause protects an employee who rebuffs his supervisor’s 
sexual advances.216 The Court’s statutory construction and discussion 
of the meaning of oppose, however, indicates that such conduct 
constitutes opposition conduct within Title VII’s meaning. First, the 
activity of saying “no” to an ultimatum for continued sex or 
termination fits the Court’s definition of opposed.217 Verbally saying 
                                                 
211 Id. (“While this is certainly an accepted usage of the term ‘oppose,’ the 
term is not always used in this sense[.]”). 
212 Id. Justice Alito believed that this weighed in favor of interpreting those 
shared traits of active or purposive conduct to other items in the statute, such as the 
word opposed. See id. 
213 Id.  
214 Id. at 854-55.  
215 Id. at 855. 
216 See id. at 852-53. 
217 Including rebuffing a supervisor’s advances within the definition of 
opposed would be a new extension of the definition for the Supreme Court and it is 
not a perfect fit. The Court’s language about the definition of opposed, however, 
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no to this type of demand, especially when it is repeated, qualifies as 
having resisted, withstood, or antagonized an unlawful employment 
practice.218 The Court also defined opposed as having been hostile or 
adverse to, “as in opinion.”219 While this language was dicta, it is 
instructive. Turning down sexual advances, especially in the face of a 
threat to be fired, is activity or an opinion that is hostile or adverse to 
the harassment, thus fitting this definition as well.220 Further, saying 
no to a supervisor in this situation qualifies as having communicated a 
belief to the employer that his activity is harassment, a definition 
unanimously accepted by the Court.221  
Second, an employee’s rebuff of a supervisor’s threat shows 
disapproval of the supervisor’s actions and may often provoke the 
supervisor to inflict some sort of payback.222 This scenario fits 
squarely within the Supreme Court’s holding that the employee in 
Crawford opposed an unlawful employment practice because she 
made “an ostensibly disapproving account of sexually obnoxious 
behavior” that led to her termination.223 Telling a supervisor “no 
more” is ostensible disapproving behavior that can lead to 
termination.224 Further, although dicta, the Court gave several 
examples of silent opposition that could constitute opposition within 
the meaning of Title VII.225 Like the employee who silently refuses to 
                                                                                                                   
indicates that it would be proper to include this type of activity as opposition 
activity. See infra notes 218-219, 221 and accompanying text. 
218 See supra note 194 and accompanying text.  
219 See supra note 195 and accompanying text. 
220 See id. 
221 See supra note 196 and accompanying text. 
222 This is exactly what happened to the employee who was fired in Tate and 
the employee who was denied a raise and ultimately fired in Ogden. See Tate v. 
Executive Mgmt. Serv., Inc., 546 F.3d 528, 529-31 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 
S.Ct. 1379 (2009); Ogden v. Wax Works, Inc., 214 F.3d 999, 1003-04 (8th Cir. 
2000). 
223 Crawford, 129 S.Ct. at 850. 
224 See supra note 221. 
225 Crawford, 129 S.Ct. at 851. For example, opposing slavery before 
Emancipation, opposing capital punishment without writing letters or protesting, and 
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implement an employer’s discriminatory policy, an employee w
rebuffs a supervisor’s sexual advances silently refuses to participate in 
unlawful conduct.
ho 
ther 
amples. 
                                                                                                                  
226 In fact, when an employee actively rebuffs a 
supervisor in this situation by saying “no,” the employee goes far
than the Supreme Court’s ex
This illustrates the third reason why an employee’s actions in this 
situation fit within Crawford’s and Title VII’s meaning of 
opposition—saying “no” is not silent opposition. While Justice Alito 
doubted that the opposition clause could protect silent opposition, 
actively saying “no” and refusing to participate in harassment is 
distinguishable from silent opposition.227 Further, even if an 
employee’s actions in this situation were construed to be silent 
opposition, such opposition, so long as it is in response to an unlawful 
employment practice, may still constitute protected activity under Title 
VII.228 Thus, the Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford shows that a 
proper reading of the opposition clause’s statutory language would 
include protecting an employee who actively and purposefully rebuffs 
a supervisor’s sexual advances. 
 
V. BEYOND TITLE VII’S LANGUAGE  
 
Several important policy and practical considerations further 
support reading the opposition clause to protect an employee who 
rebuffs her supervisor’s sexual advances. This section will examine 
these considerations by discussing (a) the importance of the 
 
an employee who simply maintain he status quo and refuses to implement an 
employer’s discriminatory policy, would all quality. Id. 
226 See id. 
227 See id. at 853-55 (Alito, J. concurring). Additionally, while an employee 
who has simply stated, “no,” has not initiated an EEOC complaint or participated in 
an internal investigation, the Supreme Court’s majority opinion expressly rejects the 
notion that the opposition clause requires participation in an investigation. See id. at 
851. 
228 See McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 262 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Passive 
resistance is a time-honored form of opposition[.]”). 
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supervisor-employee relationship, (b) the purpose and policy of the 
retaliation provision, and (c) other practical considerations. 
 
A. The Importance of the Supervisor – Employee Relationship 
 
The supervisor to employee relationship has been a dominant 
theme in employment law. In fact, employer liability for harassment 
turns almost exclusively on whether the harasser is by an employee’s 
supervisor or a coworker.229 Harassment by a supervisor triggers strict 
liability for an employer whereas harassment by a mere co-worker 
triggers liability only if the employer was negligent in discovering or 
remedying the harassment.230 A supervisor is an employee with the 
power to directly affect the terms and conditions of a person’s 
employment.231 The focus in determining whether an employee is a 
supervisor is on the power and authority the supervisor has over 
another employee.232 A supervisor generally has the power to hire, 
fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline an employee 233.  
                                                
The reasons for the distinction between a co-worker and a 
supervisor and the focus on the power of the supervisor over the 
employee are important. The Supreme Court discussed these reasons 
when it established the supervisor basis for employer liability in 
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton.234 In Faragher, the Court noted that a 
supervisor’s role gives the supervisor increased opportunity for contact 
and access to an employee.235 Since the supervisor has the power to 
alter the employee’s terms and conditions of employment, the 
 
229 Rhodes v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp., 359 F.3d 498, 505-06 (7th Cir.2004). 
230 Id.  
231 Id. at 506 (“‘Supervisor’” is a legal term of art for Title VII purposes, and 
an employee merely having authority to oversee aspects of another employee’s job 
performance does not qualify as a supervisor in the Title VII context.”). 
232 Parkins v. Civil Constr. of Ill., Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 1033-34 (7th Cir.1998) 
(“the question. . .is how much or what kind of authority must an individual possess 
to be a true supervisor”). 
233 Id. at 1033 n.1. 
234 524 U.S. 775, 803 (1998). 
235 Id. 
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employee may be less likely to risk complaining about a supervisor.236 
Further, an employee must interact with their supervisor and cannot 
simply find a way to avoid the harasser in the same way that a mere 
co-worker can be avoided. The Court found: 
 
When a fellow employee harasses, the victim can walk away or 
tell the offender where to go, but it may be difficult to offer such 
responses to a supervisor, whose “power to supervise-[which may 
be] to hire and fire, and to set work schedules and pay rates-does 
not disappear237 
 
Additionally, the Court noted that imposing liability based on a 
supervisory relationship encourages employers to prevent 
discrimination because they have a greater opportunity to control the 
actions of their managers.238 The Supreme Court’s emphasis on the 
inequality of power between a supervisor and employee is relevant to 
a consideration of a supervisor’s sexual advances in the retaliation 
context because the power relationship is the same. An employee who 
is propositioned by her supervisor cannot merely walk away like she 
could with a fellow employer.239 Further, a subordinate employee 
harassed by a supervisor will be more hesitant to complain about the 
supervisor than a fellow employee.240 The employee’s first line of 
defense against a harassing supervisor is the rejection of the 
                                                 
236 Id. 
237 Id. 
238 Id. (“Recognition of employer liability when discriminatory misuse of 
supervisory authority alters the terms and conditions of a victim's employment is 
underscored by the fact that the employer has a greater opportunity to guard against 
misconduct by supervisors than by common workers; employers have greater 
opportunity and incentive to screen them, train them, and monitor their 
performance.”). 
239 See supra note 237 and accompanying text. Indeed, the plaintiff in Tate 
attempted to walk away but was called into his supervisor’s office. See Tate v. 
Executive Mgmt. Serv., Inc., 546 F.3d 528, 530 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 
S.Ct. 1379 (2009). 
240 See supra note 236 and accompanying text. 
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supervisor’s advances. Given the inequality of power between a 
supervisor and employee in this situation and employment law’s 
traditional focus on this relationship, the existence of a supervisor to 
employee relationship weighs in favor of protecting an employee from 
retaliation when they rebuff a supervisor’s advances.241 Additionally, 
the supervisor, with his power to change the terms and conditions of 
employment, stands in for the employer as its agent.242 When an 
employee tells a supervisor that his harassment must cease, the 
employee therefore also puts the employer on notice about the 
harassment. 
 
B. The Purpose and Policy of the Retaliation Provision 
 
The purpose of Title VII’s retaliation provision in relation to the 
purposes of Title VII provides important guidance on how it should be 
interpreted and applied.243 First, as the purpose of Title VII is to 
provide substantive guarantees to create a workplace free of 
discrimination, 244 the retaliation provision’s “primary purpose” is 
provide employees with “unfettered access to [Title VII’s] statutory 
remedial mechanisms.”245 In order for Title VII’s protections from 
workplace discrimination to work, employees must feel free to stand 
                                                 
241 See also Holly D. v. California Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1174-75 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (holding because of “the imbalance of power, persistent unwanted sexual 
attention from a supervisor has the potential to result in significant harm. A 
supervisor may find love or companionship with one he oversees, but he may not use 
his position to extort sexual favors from an unwilling employee”). 
242 See generally Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 803 (1998); 
Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (“Congress wanted courts to 
look to agency principles for guidance in this area.”). 
243 See Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 54 
(2006) (“purpose reinforces what [the retaliation provision’s] language says”). 
244 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800-801 (1973). 
245 Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346, (1997); Burlington Northern, 
548 U.S. at 63 (“The substantive provision seeks to prevent injury to individuals 
based on who they are, i.e., their status. The anti-retaliation provision seeks to 
prevent harm to individuals based on what they do, i.e., their conduct.”). 
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up and complain when they feel their rights have been violated.246 By 
prohibiting retaliation against employees attempting to enforce those 
rights, the retaliation provision provides employees with the practical 
protection necessary to guarantee access to Title VII’s substantive 
guarantees.247 Protecting employees who say “no” when harassed by a 
supervisor encourages employees to stand up for their rights and helps 
guarantee the enforcement of Title VII’s prohibition on sexual 
harassment the workplace. 
Second, the Supreme Court has interpreted Title VII to support a 
policy that encourages employees to use informal methods to speak 
out against discrimination and also encourages employers to prevent 
and correct harassment. Under the Supreme Court’s companion 
decisions in Burlington Industries v. Ellerth248 and Faragher v. City of 
Boca Raton,249 an employer may plead an affirmative defense that it 
had “exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any 
sexually harassing behavior” and that the employee “unreasonably 
failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities 
provided by the employer[.]”250 This affirmative defense is only 
available, however, when an employer has not taken any adverse 
employment action against an employee.251 This standard of employer 
liability was adopted in order to encourage employees to speak out 
against harassment and take advantage of an employer’s procedures 
for harassment claims.252 By encouraging employees to report 
                                                 
246 Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 67 (“Title VII depends for its enforcement 
upon the cooperation of employees who are willing to file complaints and act as 
witnesses.”). 
247 Id. at 63 (“The anti-retaliation provision seeks to secure [Title VII’s] 
primary objective by preventing an employer from interfering (through retaliation) 
with an employee’s efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the Act’s basic 
guarantees.”)  
248 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
249 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
250 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08. 
251 Id. at 808. 
252 See Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 764 (“Title VII is designed to encourage 
the creation of antiharassment policies and effective grievance mechanisms. Were 
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harassment, employers have a greater opportunity to prevent and 
correct harassment, thus avoiding litigation. The effect of the Supreme 
Court’s incentive for employees to speak out against harassment has 
the inverse result of exposing employees to additional opportunities 
for retaliation.253 The opposition clause supports these policies by 
protecting employees in this situation254 and should similarly protect 
an employee who, following the Supreme Court’s incentive to speak 
out and resolve problems early, voices opposition to harassment to her 
supervisor.255 
Third, Title VII’s policy in favor of encouraging employees to 
speak out against unlawful discrimination explains the existence of the 
reasonable good faith belief requirement. Without the ability of an 
employee to sue for retaliation regardless of whether their employer 
actually broke the law,256 employees would be forced to file formal 
charges or lawsuits when an informal complaint might suffice to end 
the harassment.257 Employees also might run the risk of retaliation 
                                                                                                                   
employer liability to depend in part on an employer’s effort to create such 
procedures, it would effect Congress’ intention to promote conciliation rather than 
litigation in the Title VII context,. . .and the EEOC's policy of encouraging the 
development of grievance procedures. . . . To the extent limiting employer liability 
could encourage employees to report harassing conduct before it becomes severe or 
pervasive, it would also serve Title VII's deterrent purpose.”); George, supra note 
17, at 443 (“[L]iability assessments under harassment law create a legal incentive for 
an employee to report quickly to the employer behavior that might constitute a 
violation of the employer’s sexual harassment policy[.]”). 
253 See generally George, supra note 17 (discussing problems with the early 
reporting incentive). 
254 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3 (2006).  
255 Telling a supervisor “no” also provides the employer with an immediate 
opportunity to correct its behavior and prevent formal charges or litigation. 
256 See Little v. United Technologies, Carrier Transicold Div., 103 F.3d 956, 
959-60 (11th Cir. 1997). 
257 See Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 77-78 (2005) 
(“The opposition clause extends protection from retaliation to persons who complain 
informally of discrimination, stopping short of invoking the formal legal machinery 
of Title VII. Such protection is essential to support Title VII policies favoring the 
prevention of discrimination and the early, informal resolution of complaints. 
Charges of discrimination rarely reach the EEOC or the courts without some higher-
 330
40
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 4
http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol4/iss2/4
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 4, Issue 2                         Spring 2009 
 
from their employer with no effective redress if their interpretation of 
the law turned out to be incorrect.258 This would create a chilling 
effect that would discourage employees from asserting their civil 
rights and undermine the enforcement of Title VII.259 A similar 
chilling effect would be created if employees were not protected fro
retaliation when telling a supervisor to stop what the employe
harassment. 
m 
e feels is 
                                                                                                                  
The retaliation provision should be construed in accordance with 
these underlying purposes, which support protecting an employee who 
rebuffs her supervisor’s sexual advances. The Supreme Court has even 
recently recognized the importance of broadly interpreting the 
provision in accordance with its purposes.260 Furthermore, an effective 
retaliation provision is so important to the effectiveness of an anti-
discrimination statute that courts have implied retaliation protection 
for informal complaints in other federal statutes.261 Thus, the purposes 
 
level person first learning of the complainant's concerns. Without protection from 
retaliation at the early, less formal stages of complaining, challengers would be 
chilled from ever complaining or be forced into taking formal legal action when 
informal action might have been a more appropriate response, at least initially.”) 
(citations omitted). 
258 See supra note 256 and accompanying text. 
259 See Brake, supra note 257 at 77-78; Sias v. City Demonstration Agency, 
588 F.2d 692, 695 (9th Cir.1978) (“The purpose of [the retaliation provision’s 
opposition clause] is to protect the employee who utilizes the tools provided by 
Congress to protect his rights. If the availability of that protection were to turn on 
whether the employee’s charge were ultimately found to be meritorious, resort to the 
remedies provided by the Act would be severely chilled.”). 
260 See Burlington Northern v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 60-68 (2006). The Court in 
Burlington expanded the scope of adverse employment actions protected by the 
retaliation clause to be larger than those protected by Title VII. Id. The Court 
reasoned that “[i]nterpreting the anti-retaliation provision to provide broad protection 
from retaliation helps assure the cooperation upon which accomplishment of [Title 
VII’s] primary objective depends.” Id. at 67. 
261 See CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1951-55 (2008) 
(holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 includes protection from retaliation); EEOC v. 
Romeo Cmty. Schools, 976 F.2d 985, 989 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that an employee 
who informally complained of gender-based discrimination is protected from 
retaliation under the Equal Pay Act); Davis v. Flexman, 109 F. Supp. 2d 776, 803 
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behind Title VII’s retaliation provision support protecting an employee 
who rebuffs her supervisor’s sexual advances and protection of 
employees in this situation is critical to enforcing Title VII’s remedial 
provisions. 
 
C. Practical Considerations 
 
Several practical considerations further support the need to protect 
employees who rebuff their supervisor’s sexual advances. First, 
protecting this type of activity under the retaliation provision 
maintains traditional distinctions between harassment and retaliation 
claims. Some courts fear that protecting employees in this situation 
could expand the scope of protection under the retaliation provision so 
far that “every harassment claim would automatically state a 
retaliation claim”.262 This type of concern misses the subtle 
distinctions between harassment and retaliation claims. Similar facts 
can be plead under all claims, but each claim has a different legal 
focus. 263  
Even a joint quid pro quo and harassment claim based on an 
employee saying “no” to a demand for “sex or your job” does not 
impermissibly blur the line between harassment and retaliation. While 
the facts are the same, the focus of the legal claims is not—one 
focuses on the harassment of an employee based on their status as a 
man or woman, the other on the employee’s actions based on that 
perceived harassment.264 Further, even if a holding that rebuffing 
                                                                                                                   
n.26 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (protecting an employee from retaliation under the 
Rehabilitation Act, even though the Act does not contain an express retaliation 
provision). 
262 E.g. Del Castillo v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 941  F. Supp. 437, 438-39 (S.D. 
N.Y. 1996). 
263 Harassment claims focus on the underlying sexual activity and how it 
changed the terms or conditions of employment. See supra Part II.A. A retaliation 
claim, on the other hand, focuses on an employer’s reaction to perceived harassment. 
See supra Part II.B. 
264 See Tate v. Executive Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 2007 WL 1650410, *2 (N.D. Ind. 
2007), overruled by Tate v. Executive Mgmt. Servs, Inc., 546 F.3d 528 (7th Cir. 
2008), cert. denied, 2009 WL 62165 (U.S. 2009) (“When an employee is given an 
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sexual advances is protected activity caused harassment and retaliation 
claims to overlap, different adverse employment actions are covered 
by harassment and retaliation claims.265 Thus, depending on the type 
of adverse employment action an employer takes, one type of claim 
may be precluded while the other is not. 
As a practical matter, these subtle legal differences create different 
results under each type of claim and juries seem to understand the 
differences. For instance, when a quid pro quo harassment and 
retaliation claim are brought together under similar facts, a jury may 
find for the plaintiff on one claim but not the other.266 Moreover, since 
the retaliation provision’s utility as an enforcement tool of Title VII 
centers on the fact that it is intentionally broader than Title VII’s 
substantive provisions, it is proper for retaliation claims to be brought 
with harassment claims in factually similar scenarios.267 Thus, the 
purpose of the retaliation provision and the legal differences between 
                                                                                                                   
ultimatum that continued employment depends on continuing a sexual relationship, 
and the employee says ‘no more,’ that employee could reasonably be understood to 
be opposing continuing the sexual relationship and to be opposing a change in the 
terms of his employment. . .When the protesting employee is terminated, the 
termination could be motivated by the opposition to the change in employment 
terms, the opposition to the sexual relationship, or both. The retaliation claim 
intertwines with the harassment claim, but they are not identical.”); Burlington 
Northern, 548 U.S. at 63 (“The substantive provision seeks to prevent injury to 
individuals based on who they are, i.e., their status. The anti-retaliation provision 
seeks to prevent harm to individuals based on what they do, i.e., their conduct.”); 
Brake, supra note 257, at 48 (“Intentional discrimination, also known as differential 
treatment and distinguished from disparate impact, typically denotes unfavorable 
treatment directed at someone because of his or her race, sex or other protected class 
status. The touchstone of the retaliation claim, on the other hand, is that the 
complainant was retaliated against for his or her actions opposing discrimination. . . . 
Unlike the prototypical intentional discrimination model, the retaliation claim asserts 
that the harm was inflicted because of the complainant’s actions, apart from his or 
her protected class status.”). 
265 See Burlington Northern 548 U.S. at 60-68.  
266 This is exactly what happened in Tate. See Tate v. Executive Mgmt. Servs., 
Inc., 546 F.3d 528, 531 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 2009 WL 62165 (U.S. 2009). 
267 See Part V.B. 
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harassment and retaliation claims demonstrate that the two areas of 
law will not be improperly expanded or blurred. 
Second, protecting employees who rebuff their supervisor’s 
sexual advances is consistent with current precedent and would not 
expand employer liability too far. In his concurrence in Crawford, 
Justice Alito expressed concern about making employers liable for 
harassment when an employee fails to express “a word of opposition” 
to the employer.268 He noted that an employer could become liable for 
any adverse employment action taken against an employee who only 
expresses opposition while chatting to a co-worker around a water 
cooler, in a telephone conversation overheard by another co-worker, at 
a restaurant or tavern with co-workers, or at a picnic attended by a 
friend or relative of a supervisor.269 Further expanding the scope of an 
employer’s liability to cover these situations could result in plaintiffs 
filing more retaliation claims against employers.270  
Holding that an employee who rebuffs her employer’s sexual 
advances has engaged in opposition activity will not result in the type 
of drastic expansion of retaliation claims that could overburden courts. 
An employee who complains to her supervisor has in fact 
communicated a word of opposition to her employer. Further, the 
situations described by Justice Alito, such as the water cooler or picnic 
scnarioes, involve opposition that is voiced either to a co-worker or a 
non-coworker friend.271 The situation in Tate, however, involved 
voicing opposition to a supervisor, not a mere co-worker.272 
                                                 
268 Crawford v. Metropolitan Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson Cty., Tenn. 129 
S.Ct. 846, 854 (2009) (Alito, J. concurring). 
269 Id. Holding employers liable for adverse employment actions in these 
situations would be problematic because of the lack of notice to management about 
the employee’s opposition. See id. 
270 Id. at 854-55. Retaliation claims have rapidly increased at the EEOC in 
recent years. Courts are aware of this phenomena and therefore seem hesitant to 
expand liability in a way that could have the practical result of flooding the courts 
with more retaliation lawsuits. See id. 
271 See id. at 854. 
272 For a discussion of the legally significant difference between supervisors 
and co-workers, see supra Part V.A. 
 334
44
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 4
http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol4/iss2/4
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 4, Issue 2                         Spring 2009 
 
Additionally, unlike a conversation at a bar or picnic, the employee in 
Tate expressed his opposition in the workplace, not outside the 
workplace.  
These factual distinctions are critical because they put the 
employer on notice and distinguish this situation from those that have 
the true potential to expand liability for retaliation claims to an 
unmanageable level. Additionally, other types of informal opposition 
already protected under the retaliation clause include defying an 
employer’s order,273 complaining to a newspaper,274 and maintaining 
the status quo by refusing to implement an employer’s discriminatory 
order.275 Protecting an employee who informally complains to her 
supervisor about harassment is not a radical departure from these 
precedents. Thus, protecting employees who rebuff their supervisor’s 
advances will not significantly expand the scope of employer liability 
under the retaliation provision or flood the courthouse doors with 
retaliation claims. 
Finally, employees must have the ability to combat harassment at 
its point of origin and be free from retaliation for doing so. While few 
lawsuits are likely to hinge on this precise factual issue,276 holding that 
                                                 
273 See Moyo v. Gomez, 40 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir.1994), cert. denied (1995). 
274 Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 579, 580 (6th Cir.2000), cert. 
denied, 531 U.S. 1052 (2000) (holding that opposition activity includes 
“complaining to anyone (management, unions, other employees, or newspapers) 
about allegedly unlawful practices; refusing to obey an order because the worker 
thinks it is unlawful under Title VII; and opposing unlawful acts by persons other 
than the employer-e.g., former employers, union, and co-workers.”). 
275 See id. See also Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 116 P.3d 1123, 1036 (Cal. 
2005) (holding that “that an employee’s refusal to follow a supervisor’s order that 
she reasonably believes to be discriminatory constitutes protected activity under the 
[Fair Employment and Housing Act] and that an employer may not retaliate against 
an employee on the basis of such conduct when the employer, in light of all the 
circumstances, knows that the employee believes the order to be discriminatory, 
even when the employee does not explicitly state to her supervisor or employer that 
she believes the order to be discriminatory”). 
276 Employees will often later oppose harassment in other ways such as 
complaining to a different member of management, or filing an internal grievance or 
EEOC charge. See Ogden v. Wax Works, Inc. 214 F.3d 999, 1004-05 (8th Cir. 
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rebuffing a supervisor’s sexual advances does not constitute 
opposition activity may have the practical result of discouraging 
employees from combating and resolving harassment at its earliest 
stage. Such a result would undermine the ability of employees to 
enforce Title VII’s remedial provisions, run counter to the language of 
the retaliation provision, and violate Title VII’s most important 
policies. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The language, purpose, and practical implications of the 
retaliation clause show that rebuffing a supervisor’s demand for sex 
should usually constitute opposition activity. Courts must still examine 
the facts of each case and this situation should not qualify as 
opposition activity as a matter of law. However, when the facts are 
close, the line should be drawn in favor of holding that an employee 
who rebuffs his supervisor’s sexual advances has opposed an unlawful 
employment practice. A policy in favor of protecting employees in this 
situation fits the language of the retaliation provision, follows 
Supreme Court precedent interpreting the opposition clause, serves the 
purposes of Title VII and the retaliation provision, and provides 
protection for employees in a particularly vulnerable situation.  
The fact that the employee in Tate had engaged in a consensual 
sexual relationship with his boss and responded to her ultimatum by 
saying he wasn’t “messing with” her anymore presented the jury with 
a very close factual scenario. The jury resolved it in favor of Tate. The 
Seventh Circuit, however, resolved it in favor of Tate’s employer and a 
strict reading of the reasonable belief requirement. In doing so, the 
Seventh Circuit parsed the record for statements indicating that Tate 
didn’t believe he was being harassed and overturned the will of the 
jury. Given the close factual scenario and established reasonable belief 
requirement, the Seventh Circuit’s decision is understandable. Still, the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Tate disregards the complete factual 
                                                                                                                   
2000). In addition to rebuffing her supervisor, Ogden later complained to 
management. Id. 
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circumstances of the case as well as the language and policy 
considerations that support protecting an employee in Tate’s situation. 
Alshafi Tate was repeatedly given an ultimatum from his 
supervisor to choose between sex and his job, he voiced opposition to 
the supervisor about that ultimatum, and when he finally rebuffed the 
supervisor’s sexual advances, he was sent home and fired before he 
could report to work the next morning. Employees in these types of 
situations must be protected from retaliation. A failure to do so may 
have the perverse result of handicapping an employee’s ability to resist 
harassment while they are actually being harassed. The language of 
Title VII, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the meaning of 
opposed, and the purpose of the retaliation provision all demonstrate 
that in close factual scnarioes like the one in Tate, courts should draw 
the line in favor of protecting employees. By doing so, courts not only 
remain true to the language and purpose of Title VII, but they protect 
employees when it matters most by giving a legal backbone to the idea 
that “no means no.” 
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